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Abstract The problem we face today is that there is a huge gap between our
ethical judgments about the ecological crisis on the one hand and our ethical
behavior according to these judgments on the other. In this article, we ask to what
extent a phenomenology of the ecological crisis enables us to bridge this gap and
display more ethical or pro-environmental behavior. To answer this question, our
point of departure is the affordance theory of the American psychologist and
founding father of ecological psychology, James Gibson. There are two reasons for
taking this approach. First of all, an ontological reading of Gibson’s affordance
theory provides a concept of nature which is non-dualistic, non-anthropocentric and
eco-centric, but is not seen as an ‘intrinsic value’ or product of ‘human valuation’.
Secondly, the affordance ontology provides us with a concept of nature which in
itself calls for certain action and behavior. If we indeed face a gap between ethical
judgment and ethical behavior with regard to the current ecological crisis, an af-
fordance of nature could bridge this gap. Based on our ontological reading of
Gibson’s affordance theory, we open a radically new perspective on the current
ecological crisis and the responsibility of mankind with regard to this crisis.
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Introduction
The main societal problem we face today is not that the necessity of a more
sustainable economy is not recognized. Thanks to the stream of information
supplied by science and politics, media and business leaders, we are becoming
increasingly aware of the potentially disastrous impact of climate change and the
need for a more sustainable economy. The real problem we face today is that there
is a huge gap between our ethical judgments about the ecological crisis on the one
hand and our ethical behavior according to these judgments on the other. In the
Living Planet Report 2012, for instance, it becomes clear that humanity is using
50 % more resources than the earth can provide, and that we need more than two
planets to support our modern way of living by 2030. More in particular, it is
acknowledged that biodiversity is still declining and that 2.7 million people around
the world have to cope with water scarcity (WWF 2012). People in richer regions
should reduce their resource use so that people in poorer regions can increase theirs
(Friends of the Earth 2009). Although all this is widely acknowledged, hardly any
sign can be found today that this ‘knowledge’ has resulted in significant changes in
our actual behavior (PBL 2013).
In the philosophical tradition from Aristotle on, such a gap between ethical
judgment and ethical behavior is explained in terms of the akrasia or impotence of
people to act in accordance with reason. According to Aristotle, such a state is due
to emotions or feelings which prevent rational choice, for instance our appetite for
pleasure (Aristotle 1990, 1145a15ff). Can we lay the blame for people’s
irresponsiveness or indifference with regard to the ecological crisis on their
irrationality or hedonism? As a consequence, we could explore interventions with
the aim of making more reasonable choices in environmental affairs, ranging from
education for sustainable development in order to increase environmental
consciousness, to all kinds of policies for the restriction of industrial pollution,
the preservation of natural resources or the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
We can also criticize this focus on ‘knowledge’ to promote ethical behavior.
From a Levinassian perspective, we can argue that knowledge has nothing to do
with ethical behavior. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas argues: ‘‘Western philosophy
has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by
interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being’’
(Levinas 1969, 43). According to Levinas, knowledge presupposes the introduction
of a middle term—concepts like ‘human’, ‘nature’ etc.—as a unifying principle in
the light of which different humans for instance merge together and all appear as the
same animal rationale. Levinas speaks of a reduction because the singularity or
otherness of different humans is neglected in favor of their sameness as animal
rationale. For this reason, Levinas argues: ‘‘The relation with Being that is enacted
as ontology consists in neutralizing the existent in order to comprehend or grasp it.
It is hence not a relation with the other as such but the reduction of the other to the
same’’ (Levinas 1969, 45–46). Because of this reduction, we can grasp and
understand different humans as each being an animal rationale, for instance, but this
knowledge according to Levinas will never result in ethical behavior; ‘‘Ethical
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witnessing is a revelation that is not [a matter of] knowledge’’ (cited in Casey 2003,
189). According to Levinas, ethics consist precisely in our responsiveness to the
singularity of the existent which is neglected in knowledge, i.e. the ‘face’ of another
person. From a Levinassian perspective, therefore, we can argue that the gap
between ethical judgement and ethical behavior cannot be bridged by the
enhancement of knowledge and rational choice; only the singularity of the face
of another person can call us to act in an ethical way.
Does Levinas provide a model for appropriate ethical behavior in response to the
ecological crisis we face today? Building on Levinas’s thought, Casey (2003) tried
to develop a phenomenological environmental ethics. To this end, he first of all
extended the concept of the face, which was originally restricted to persons, to the
environment as a whole; it is the singularity of the sur-face of the environment
which according to Casey calls us to act in an ethical way.1 Secondly, he introduced
the human glance of distress at the environmental surface as a necessary condition
for ethical action:
An ethics of the environment must begin with the sheer and simple fact of
being struck by something wrong happening in the surrounding world. It is by
noticing that something is out of joint—does not fit or function well—that a
response is elicited and an action induced. Responsive action begins with what
John Dewey called the ‘‘problematic situation’’. Unless this situation is
apprehended in its very problematicity, it will remain noxious, troublesome,
harmful. People will go on being persecuted and tortured, chemicals will
circulate freely in the air, and food and water will be poisoned—unless
attention is given to what is awry in these circumstances. … My claim is that
the human glance, meagre as it seems to be, is indispensable for consequential
ethical action (Casey 2003, 187–188).
In order to make his case, Casey refers to the affordance theory of the American
psychologist and founding father of ecological psychology, James Gibson. Gibson
argued that the surface or layout of the environment ‘affords’ specific behavior for
1 Although Levinas may inspire environmental philosophers to extend the face of the Other to the sur-
face of the environment, it is clear that Levinas himself would reject such an extension. He not only limits
the concept of the face explicitly to the face of human beings–animals do not have a face—but he also
rejects any direct ethical obligation to nature: ‘‘Pure nature, when it does not attest to the glory of God,
when it is no one’s, indifferent and inhuman nature, is situated on the fringes of this human world, and is
only understandable as such on the plane of the human world of property’’ (Levinas 1987: 28–29). Only
in the context of our ethical obligations toward the other (human beings) does nature have a function to
provide food, shelter etc. But according to Levinas nature as such is opposed to ethics. The reason is that
nature is characterized by the Darwinian struggle for existence, i.e. the ‘‘natural will to put my own
existence first’’, while ethics on the contrary consists in our submission to the Other (cf. Nelson 2012:
109–133). In this respect, the infinity of the face of the Other and the infinity of nature are incomparable
(cf. Toadvine 2012: 164–165); a Levinassian ethics of the environment can therefore not be derived from
and justified by an appeal to nature (Nelson 2012: 120). In his insightful article, Toadvine therefore
concludes: ‘‘… to be ethical first of all requires turning one’s back on the struggle for existence that
characterizes the natural world and animal life. It is this sense of nature that is at stake in Levinas’s
insistence that ethics is a gratuitous ‘rupture with nature’. Adopting this view on nature, Levinas’s ethics
may in fact pose the greatest challenge to any future environmental philosophy that would recognize
obligations toward nature as such’’ (Toadvine 2012: 179). In this respect, Levinas’s thought cannot be
taken as a kind of proto-environmentalism, as Casey seems to do.
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animals in the environment (see ‘‘Affordance and Behavior’’ section for a
discussion of the concept of affordance). Inspired by Gibson, Casey claims that
the phenomenological human glance of environmental distress is the source of the
compelling power to act ethically; environmental distress motivates or ‘affords’ us
‘‘to alter the disturbed circumstance: to ‘‘set it right’’’’ (Casey 2003, 204).2
Following Levinas, Casey rejects ‘knowledge’ and stresses the sur-face of the
environment as the origin of our ethical and pro-environmental behavior. In fact, he
replaces knowledge of the environment by the phenomenological human glance of
the environment to prevent the akrasia that manifests itself in the gap between our
ethical judgments about the ecological crisis and our ethical behavior according to
this judgment. In the human glance of environmental distress, we are immediately
called or ‘afforded’ to act pro-environmentally (Casey 2003, 203).
One can argue, however, that Casey didn’t solve the problem of akrasia because
the human glance of the ecological crisis doesn’t lead automatically to more pro-
environmental behavior. Also Casey himself had to admit that there are masses of
people who do not respond to the experience of environmental distress. This means
that in the end, the human glance of environmental distress is insufficient to
encourage more pro-environmental behavior.
According to Casey, this ‘failure’ to respond to the affordances in the
environment is due to ‘‘the detached Cartesian eye that bespeaks a massive cultural
disconnect between human beings and their environments’’ (Casey 2003, 205).
Human being is understood here as apart from nature and consists in the will to
master and exploit the natural world as a commodity for human needs. This human-
as-apart-from-nature attitude of modern mankind is characterized by a fundamental
dualism between humankind and nature, whereby humans create and project values
onto an in itself valueless world, i.e. humanity is the Cartesian maˆitre et possesseur
de la nature. What this human-as-apart-from-nature attitude fails to see, according
to Casey, is our lived connectedness with the world around us.3 Our ethical
responsiveness toward the ecological crisis therefore not only presupposes the
human glance of the affordances in the environment but also a conceptualizing of
human existence as interconnected with the environment; a human-as-a-part-of-
nature attitude which is characterized by non-dualism, non-anthropocentrism and
eco-centrism. As long as the human-as-apart-from-nature attitude is dominant in our
society, the human glance of environmental distress is insufficient to bridge the gap
between our ethical judgments about the ecological crisis and our ethical behavior
according to these judgments.
2 Humphrey (2000) has shown that such a seemingly automatic link between ‘perception’ and ‘action’
makes moral freedom of action problematic.
3 In this, Casey’s position resembles that of the deep ecologists, who called for a new understanding of
what humanity and nature are in itself (non-dualistic, non-anthropocentric and eco-centric). We have to
move away from the traditional humans-apart-from-nature attitude toward one that sees humans-as-a-
part-of-nature according to the deep ecologists. Naess for instance rejects ‘‘the total man-in-environment
image in favour of the relational total-field image. Organisms as knots in the bio spherical net or field of
intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to the
definition or basic constitution of A and B, so that without the relation, A and B would no longer be the
same things’’ (Naess 1973; cf. Marietta 1995).
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What Casey failed to notice in his reading of Gibson’s work is, however, that an
affordance in the environment in itself calls for and is accompanied by actual
behavior. This means that a gap between ethical judgments and ethical behavior
could be bridged by an affordance of nature. In this article, we revisit the affordance
theory of Gibson in order to bridge the gap between ethical judgment and ethical
behavior in the current ecological crisis. There are two specific reasons to consult
Gibson’s work in this respect: First of all, Gibson provides a concept of human
existence as interconnected with the environment that is characterized by non-
dualism, non-anthropocentrism and eco-centrism. Secondly, this concept of the
interconnectedness of human existence and the environment is conceptualized in
such a way that the environment really ‘affords’ action and behavior. In this article,
we first explore Gibson’s affordance theory in order to bridge the gap between
ethical judgment and ethical behavior with regard to the current ecological crisis
(see ‘‘Affordance and Behavior’’ section). Based on the current discussion of the
affordance of nature, we open a radically new perspective on the current ecological
crisis and the nature of our ethical judgments with regard to this crisis (see
‘‘Analysis: The Affordance of Nature in the Age of Management’’ section). In
‘‘Conclusion: The Affordance of Ecological Awareness’’ section we reflect on the
implications of this analysis for our actual behavior in response to the ecological
crisis, and draw some conclusions.
Affordance and Behavior
The Affordance Theory of James Gibson4
According to James Gibson, one of the most influential psychologists in the field of
visual perception in the twentieth century, we do not perceive stimulus information
from the outside world, which we then process consciously or unconsciously, but we
perceive affordances in the environment. The word ‘‘affordance’’ indicates the
meaning of a thing or organism in the environment, which is detected or picked up
by the perceiver and allows him to perform a specific kind of action; air affords
breathing and water affords drinking for example, a chair affords sitting and a
hammer affords hammering. According to Gibson, ‘‘the affordance of anything is a
specific combination of the properties of its substance and its surfaces taken with
reference to an animal’’ (Gibson 1977, 67). If a substance is rigid, horizontal and
extended for instance, then it affords support; it is the ground or floor we are
walking on.
Not only the physical environment, but also other animals harbour affordances
according to Gibson. Their sexual, predatory, nurturing, fighting, cooperating and
communicating interactions for instance harbour a complex set of affordances: A
beautiful butterfly, for example, affords its predator to hunt for it. Although the
butterfly affords hunting, this doesn’t mean that the meaning of the butterfly for the
4 Parts of this section were published already in Blok (2014). See there for a more in-depth analysis
of Gibson’s affordance ontology.
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predator is a characteristic of the butterfly. The affordance is taken with reference to
an animal: a rigid and horizontal surface affords support for the predator for
instance, but not for fish. In the same way, air affords flying for butterflies but not
for a cat as their predator. This relativity of the affordance doesn’t mean that the
meaning of the butterfly depends on the valuation of this object by the subject. In the
case of inanimate objects, affordances stem from the environment, and in the case of
animate objects, affordances come up in the reciprocity of animals and other
animals. Gibson provides the example of a mother and her child and a prey and its
predator: What the child affords the mother is reciprocal to what the mother affords
the child and what the prey affords the predator-hunting—is reciprocal to what the
predator affords the prey-hiding. In this respect, we already have to nuance Casey’s
idea that the affordance is a property of the surface of the environment, which
affords ethical behavior. In fact, the affordance points two ways and therefore
cannot be understood as a property of the surface of the environment as Casey
thought (i.e. a property of an object) nor as the product of the human glance
(property of the subject).
As I have argued elsewhere, we have to conceive affordances at an ontological
level (cf. Blok 2014). This means that the predator for instance does not first see the
prey and then takes action. On the contrary, prey and predator are constituted by
their mutual affordances; in the mutual affordances of prey and predator, the prey
affords hunting and the predator affords hiding, and in their actual behaviour in
response to the affordance their identities as prey and as predator are performatively
constituted; in their mutual affordance, the prey becomes the one hiding from the
predator and looking for shelter in holes and caves, while the predator becomes the
one hunting for the prey. With this, it becomes clear how the affordance has to be
understood. The affordance is the (non-subjective) meaning of the prey and the
predator. This sense or meaning comes up in the reciprocity between prey and
predator; both butterfly and predator live already in a meaningful world in which
they are what they are, i.e. perform hiding and seeking. The ontological status of the
affordance is that it articulates a meaningful world (eco-system) for an organism and
allows it to perform its specific behavior as prey, as predator etc.
How do we have to conceive the concept of nature from a Gibsonian
perspective5? To explain the reciprocity of animal and environment, Gibson makes
use of the ecological concept of a niche. A niche can be seen as a set of
environmental features which are suitable for a specific species and into which this
species fits (Gibson 1977, 69). It concerns the natural environment, which is
understood in a non-dualistic and non-anthropocentric way. Gibson would agree
with Casey that humankind is interconnected with the environment (see ‘‘Intro-
duction’’). Both organisms like humans and the natural environment are constituted
by their reciprocity, for instance the mutual supportive realities of the environment
(materials for making a house) and a human being which settles itself in this
5 It is clear that Gibson’s primary goal was to develop an ecological physics and that he was not
interested in the development of a concept of nature. Nevertheless, there is no reason in principle why his
analysis of the affordance cannot be applied at the level of specific eco-systems— Kadar and Effken
(1994) developed for instance such a regional ontology—and at the level of the eco-system of the earth or
nature as a whole—Sanders (1997) for instance developed such a general ontology (Sanders 1997, 108).
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environment to build his house. ‘‘We all fit into the substructures of the environment
in our various ways for we were all, in fact, formed by them. We were created by the
world we live in’’ (Gibson 1977, 71). Furthermore, this Gibsonian concept of nature
is eco-centric: ‘‘The reciprocity of animal and environment is implied by this theory
for the niche implies a certain kind of animal and the species implies a special niche.
But the independent existence of an unlimited environment is also implied, for the
niches must be available before animals can begin to exploit them. The affording of
life by the environment is presumably of unlimited richness and complexity’’
(Gibson 1977, 69).
The eco-centrism of a Gibsonian concept of nature shows itself not only in the
concept of the niche, in which all animal behavior is understood as responsive
behavior in response to affordances in the environment and in this way is
interrelated. It shows itself also in the fact that the ‘‘independent existence of an
unlimited environment’’ (Gibson 1977, 69) is assumed. That means that besides the
actual occupation of a niche by an animal, the environment provides possibilities
for action that have not been taken advantage of; the possible sense or meaning of
nature is always beyond the actual meaning of the world we live in. In this sense,
nature is limitless according to Gibson. We encounter here a second meaning of
nature, besides the concept of the niche where there is a mutual reciprocity of the
environment and human existence; nature as the unlimited domain of possible
affordances. Although Gibson himself didn’t explore the relation between nature as
niche and nature as an ‘‘unlimited richness and complexity’’ of the environment, we
can conceptualize this concept of nature as the material domain or substrate where
possible affordances originate from and actual affordances go back to.6
The Affordance of (Ethical) Behavior
With our ontological reading of Gibson’s affordance theory, we encounter a concept
of human existence as interconnected with nature, and which is characterized by
non-dualism, non-anthropocentrism and eco-centrism. Is it possible to conceptualize
this interconnectedness of human existence and nature in such a way that the
environment really affords ethical behavior? Our Gibsonian concept of the
interconnectedness of human existence and the environment is promising in this
respect, because affordances in the environment call for certain action and behavior;
the prey affords the activity of hunting for the predator and vice versa. Does our
Gibsonian concept of the interconnectedness of human existence and nature serve
our objective in this article to bridge the gap between ethical judgment and ethical
behavior?
To understand the relation between the meaningful eco-system organisms live in
and its call for action and behavior, we focus for a moment on Gibson’s discussion
with one of his predecessors, the gestalt psychologist Koffka (1886–1941).
According to the gestalt psychologists, the meaning of an object is perceived just
as immediately as its size or color. This meaning of an organism is not a neutral
6 The question whether the affordances of nature are the product of a generative power of this materiality,
for instance the product of ‘vibrant matter’, is beyond the scope of this article (cf. Bennett 2010).
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quality of an object in front of us, but is something demanding immediate action:
‘‘Man behaves in a situation as the situation tells him to behave… Each thing says
what it is… a fruit says, ‘‘Eat me’’; water says, ‘‘Drink me’’; thunder says, ‘‘Fear
me’’; and woman says, ‘‘Love me’’ (Koffka 1935, 7). Fruit and water ‘‘tell us what
to do with them’’ (Koffka 1935, 353), they demand us to eat them or to drink them.
Thus, our understanding of the meaning of an organism not only underlies our
practical dealing with these organisms, but this meaning directly invites or demands
specific behavior: eating, loving etc.
While Koffka argued that this demand-character of the meaning of an observed
object varies with the need of the observer—a post-box for instance has only
demand character for us when we need to mail a letter—Gibson draws another
conclusion. Because the observer and that which is observed are constituted by their
mutual reciprocity and not the other way around, the constituent (the affordance)
cannot change as the need for that which is constituted changes, i.e. the post-box for
a letter-mailing human being. ‘‘I prefer to say that the real post-box… affords letter-
mailing to a letter-writing human in a community with a postal system. This fact is
perceived when the post-box is identified as such, and it is apprehended whether the
post-box is in sight or out of sight. To feel a special attraction to it when one has a
letter to mail is not surprising but the main fact is that it is perceived as part of the
environment—as an item of the neighborhood in which we live. Everyone above the
age of six knows what it is for and where the nearest one is’’ (Gibson 1977, 78).
This mutual reciprocity constitutes a meaningful world (eco-system) in which
post-boxes are ‘on the corner’ for ‘love- or application letter’ writing humans or
people who have to ‘announce a marriage or the death of someone’ and so on; both
the post-box and the letter writing human being exist in a meaningful world in
which they are what they are and act accordingly. For Gibson therefore, the sense or
meaning is not restricted to an individual organism, but concerns the whole of a
meaningful world in which human beings and post-boxes are at home. This
meaningful world of letters and post-boxes (ontic level) is first of all constituted by
their mutual reciprocity (ontological level), in which the post-box becomes post-box
for ‘love- or application letter’ writing humans. Secondly, the demand-character
cannot be separated from the meaning-character of the affordance: ‘‘The theory of
affordances implies that to see things is to see how to get about among them and
what to do or not to do with them’’ (Gibson 1979, 223). Just as the prey becomes the
one hiding from the predator in the mutual reciprocity between prey and predator, a
human being becomes the one who is actually writing and sending letters in the
mutual reciprocity between post-box and human being.7 The constitution of a
meaningful world in which human being appears as sender and receiver of mail is
the ‘main fact’ (ontological level), not the ‘special attraction’ to the post-box on the
ontic level.
With the elaboration of the intrinsic relation between the meaning-character and
the demand-character of the affordance, we not only encounter a concept of human
7 I agree with Sanders’s analysis that the affordance to write a letter doesn’t have to be complemented or
effectuated by our intention to write such a letter. Intention is vital in perception, but is already implicit in
the idea of affordance (Sanders 1997, 105).
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existence as interconnected with nature, but this interconnectedness consists in our
responsiveness to the affordances of nature. If nowadays we face a gap between our
ethical judgments about the ecological crisis and our actual ethical behavior
according to these judgments, the question arises whether an affordance of nature
could bridge this gap. Our Gibsonian concept of human existence as interconnected
with nature is at least promising in this respect, because affordances call for action
and behavior for organisms which are able to notice them. In the next section,
therefore, we ask whether an affordance of nature could lead to more ethical
behavior.
Analysis: The Affordance of Nature in the Age of Management
If we look at the current ecological crisis, we face a growing and threatening
ecological catastrophe. Climate change, loss of biodiversity, desertification,
poisoned seas and agricultural land, all these phenomena show the way we
currently harm our planet. According to Casey, our ‘failure’ to be responsive to
environmental distress is due to our humans-as-apart-from-nature attitude (see
introduction). While the human-as-apart-from-nature attitude of human being is
blind to the affordances of nature, the human-as-a-part-of-nature attitude is in fact
afforded to perform ethical behavior, according to Casey.
In the previous section, we developed such a concept of human existence which
is interconnected with nature, based on the work of James Gibson. This concept is
promising in two respects; first of all, the affordance ontology provides a non-
dualist, non-anthropocentric and eco-centrist concept of human existence as-a-part-
of-nature. Secondly, the affordance ontology provides a concept of human existence
which is primarily responsive to the affordances of nature. But if we take this
concept of the interconnectedness of human existence and nature into consideration,
we have to draw a radically different conclusion than Casey.
If the concept of the affordance provides us with a concept of human existence
which is interconnected with nature and is characterized by non-anthropocentrism,
we cannot blame a specific human attitude for ‘‘missing the message’’ of nature, as
Casey suggests (Casey 2003, 205). The interconnectedness of human existence and
nature first of all prevents us from blaming unsustainable behavior on human beings
as one of the actors involved in this interrelation.8 In fact, if human existence and
nature are both constituted by their mutual reciprocity and act accordingly, ‘we’ are
not the primary subject of the decision to exhibit a specific kind of responsiveness to
the affordances of nature. In this respect does Casey’s position still contain a hidden
form of anthropocentrism.
Secondly, we cannot even distinguish anymore between a human attitude which
is blind to the affordances of nature and a human attitude which is really afforded to
perform ethical behavior. If nature and human existence are both constituted by
8 The hesitation to identify human existence as a single cause or causa efficiens of the ecological crisis in
case human existence is understood as interconnected with nature, is also acknowledged by other authors
(cf. Bennett 2010).
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their mutual reciprocity and act accordingly, all human behavior has to be
understood as responsive action in response to the affordances of nature. Just as the
prey becomes the one hiding from the predator in the mutual reciprocity between
prey and predator, the human being becomes the one acting according to the
affordances of nature9; the first conclusion we have to draw, therefore, is that all
human behavior is already responsive to the affordances of nature, the human-as-
apart-from-nature attitude no less than the human-as-a-part-of-nature attitude.
This conclusion seems at first sight to be counter-intuitive. According to a critical
reader, there is still a world of difference between a human being who is motivated
to ‘alter the disturbed circumstances’ and displays behavior aimed at conserving
natural resources, and a human being who is ‘blind’ to the ecological crisis and goes
on with the depletion of the natural resources of the earth. The differentiation
between a human-as-apart-from-nature and a human-as-a-part-of-nature attitude
seems to be highly relevant with respect to the current ecological crisis.
And yet, as Ladelle McWhorter has pointed out, both nature destroying and
nature conserving behavior can be characterized by the word management.
Today, on all sides of the ecological debate, we hear, with greater and greater
frequency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to
manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand,
conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty
of coal and oil and grizzly bears and recreational facilities for future
generations to use and enjoy. These groups, and factions within them, debate
vociferously over which management policies are the best—that is, the most
cost-efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups
and contend that it is human population growth, resource consumption, and
rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look,
wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management (McWhorter 2009,
9).
Although there seems to be a world of difference between a depleting and a
conserving human attitude toward natural resources, they are essentially the same;
the sense or meaning of human being on the ontological level, namely as manager
of human and natural resources, is the main fact, not specific behavior such as nature
conserving or nature destroying behavior.
This means, first of all, that the depleting attitude is not blind to the affordances
in the environment as Casey suggests, because this managerial behavior is just as
responsive to the affordances of nature as the conserving attitude. This means,
secondly, that the depleting attitude is not a human-as-apart-from-nature attitude,
because this attitude is just as the human-as-a-part-of-nature attitude constituted by
the mutual reciprocity between men and nature, and therefore is a-part-of-nature.
This means, thirdly, that we are not in need of a new conceptualization of human
existence as interconnected with the environment, as Casey suggests; all human
behavior is already constituted by the mutual reciprocity between human existence
9 Harry Heft already argued that the affordance includes the requisite intentional aspects of our response
to the affordance of nature (cf. Heft 1989; cf. Sanders 1997).
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and the environment and therefore, already responsive to the affordances of nature.
We therefore have to reject Casey’s idea that the ‘failure’ to respond to the
affordances of nature is due to a humans-as-apart-from-nature attitude; not only our
judgment (knowledge) about the ecological crisis is an insufficient condition for the
accomplishment of more ethical and pro-environmental behavior, but the same
holds true for a human-as-a-part-of-nature attitude of human existence.
What then could explain the persistence of the gap between our ethical judgments
about the ecological crisis and our ethical behavior according to these judgments,
given the fact that the human glance of environmental distress cannot be missed
anymore in our society? We have to draw a negative conclusion first, namely that in
our current society, no such thing can be found as an affordance to ‘set things right’,
based on the human glance of environmental distress.10 In fact, the depleting
attitude itself is due to affordances of nature. In the current age, we are not or not
primarily afforded to ‘alter the disturbed circumstance’ as Casey suggests, but to
manage the human and natural resources of our planet. It is this affordance of nature
to manage human and natural resources which explains the gap between our ethical
judgments with regard to the ecological crisis and our ethical behavior according to
these judgments.
‘We’ cannot even be held ‘responsible’ for this gap. Such a position contains the
anthropocentric gesture that ‘we’ have to ‘set things right’ and fails to see the
interconnectedness between human existence and nature, misses the mutual
reciprocity between the affordances of nature and our responsiveness to these
affordances. And if we take the eco-centrism of this mutuality into account, we have
to draw an even more radical conclusion, namely that nature herself is ‘responsible’
for the destruction of the planet. Why? If both eco-system depleting and destroying
management practices are responsive to affordances of nature, this responsiveness is
grounded in the mutual reciprocity between human existence and nature. And if this
mutuality has to be understood in an eco-centric way, then the destruction of the
planet is initiated by an affordance of nature herself. The affordance ontology
therefore opens a new perspective on the current ecological crisis: to the extent that
the destruction of the environment is responsive to an affordance of nature, this
destruction can be seen as the self-destruction of nature.11 This new perspective on
the current ecological crisis is the price we have to pay for a concept of human
existence as primarily responsive to the affordances of nature.
Conclusion: The Affordance of Ecological Awareness
In the previous section, we have seen that human existence is always responsive to
affordances of nature, both the natural resources conserving attitude and the natural
resources depleting attitude, and that the destruction of planet earth is initiated by an
10 In this, I follow authors like Bruno Latour who admit that the inspiration of nature to live an ecological
life is still present in our society, but in decline under the pressure of the technologization of our relation
with nature.
11 See Reza Negarestani’s novel Cyclonopedia for a fictional exploration of this idea of the self-
destruction of nature.
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affordance of nature herself. At the same time, the ecological crisis confronts us
with an absolute limit of the carrying capacity of the ecosystems of planet earth, and
the experience that it cannot continue like this. Sloterdijk (2009) even speaks of a
new imperative due to the environmental distress we are confronted with12: you
have to change your life. Where do we find the affordance to change our life, and to
what extent is this changed way of life different from the management of natural
and human resources?
Our responsiveness to the affordances of nature doesn’t mean that human
existence is completely passive with regard to the affordances of nature, and that
people are forced to contribute to the management of human and natural resources.
As we have seen in section one, the eco-centrism of the affordance ontology not
only means that human existence is responsive to actual affordances of nature.
Besides the actual occupation of a niche by our responsiveness to the affordances of
nature, the environment provides possibilities for action that have not been taken
advantage of. Is it possible to ground our pro-environmental behavior on
possibilities for action, instead of on actual affordances provided by the
environment?
Casey’s environmentalism can be considered responsive to actual affordances of
nature. It consists in the decision to alter the disturbed circumstances and to take
care of the non-human environment, and is embedded in an anthropocentric human
ethos to manage human and natural resources. But it is not necessary to live and act
on earth as a manager of human and natural resources. Our discussion of the
affordance ontology in this article opens precisely a possibility for action that has
not been taken advantage of till now; the affordance ontology displaces human
being from the center (non-anthropocentrism) and articulates our human respon-
siveness to the affordances of nature (eco-centrism). Furthermore, the affordance
ontology bridges the fundamental division between human existence and the (non-
human) environment in favor of the interconnectedness and mutual reciprocity of
our conjoint action and behavior. This non-dualist, non-anthropocentric and eco-
centric conceptualization of our human responsiveness to the affordances of nature
opens a perspective on human action and behavior as interconnected with and
responsive to the affordances of nature. As a consequence, ‘we’ are not primarily
responsible for taking care of planet earth; this involves a conjoint action of human
and non-human agents that build the eco-systems of planet earth. In this respect, the
affordance ontology opens a perspective on human existence that is no longer living
on earth but living as earth (cf. Bennett 2010). Contrary to a human ethos that
consists in the management of human and natural resources in order to protect the
non-human environment, the affordance ontology opens the possibility of a human
ethos that consists in the engagement with nature as the material domain that both
humans and the non-human environment are part of, and which is the substrate
where possible affordances originate from and actual affordances go back to. Can
12 Cf. ‘‘Yet as is the case with any disposition, distress propels the self as ‘‘thrown’’ into the forefront of a
situation, in such a way as to call attention to its furthest margins where the contours of the ethos first
arise. By experiencing distress, human beings enter the breach of a crisis, in which all of the variables that




the affordance ontology be seen as an affordance to change our life, which no longer
consist in our living on earth but in our living as earth?
The distinction between actual and possible affordances of nature enables us to
acknowledge the actual fit between nature as resource and human being as the
manager of these resources in the age of management, and to keep open the
possibility in principle of another affordance of nature at the same time; the non-
dualist, non-anthropocentric and eco-centric engagement with nature and as nature.
Although humanity will not easily give up its special position as manager of planet
earth, it is this anthropocentric gesture that we have to abandon in favor of an
emerging ecological awareness of the interconnectedness and interdependency of
human and non-human actors in the environment (cf. Morton 2013). What is the
role of human action and behavior in this transition to this ecological awareness?
If we take the interconnectedness and conjoint action of human and non-human
actors seriously, the transition from human existence as manager to an eco-centric
concept of human existence is not dependent on our knowledge or on our human-as-
a-part-of-nature attitude, but primarily on the emergence of another affordance of
nature itself. According to philosophers like Morton, ‘hyperobjects’ like global
warming compel us to think ecologically (Morton 2013, 48). On the one hand, the
hegemony of human existence as manager of natural and human resources in our
society may be seen as an indication that we are possibly waiting for an affordance
that still has to come. On the other hand, if we take the interconnectedness and
conjoint action of human and non-human actors seriously, the emergence of such an
affordance of nature presupposes our actual responsiveness to this possible
affordance of nature as well; the affordance, as we have seen, involves action and
behavior, and this means that a new affordance of nature in fact only lies in our
actual responsiveness to this possible affordance. This means that we have to
explore and experiment with a non-dualist, non-anthropocentric and eco-centric
concept of our human responsiveness to the affordances of nature, i.e. to experiment
with the rejection of our living on earth and the acceptance of our living and acting
as earth. And here, our responsibility in the age of management becomes clear. In
the wake of Casey’s call for the human glance, we could argue that the human
glance precisely concerns the phenomenological sensitivity to the possible
affordances of nature beyond the actual affordances in the age of management,
and consists in the experimentation with this non-dualist, non-anthropocentric and
eco-centric concept of our human responsiveness to the affordances of nature, i.e.
the experimentation with the conjoint action of human and non-human actors in
order to make this transition from our living on earth to our living as earth happen.
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